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Introduction 
US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, an American military base in Okinawa, Japan, 
has long been unpopular with local residents. This chapter discusses a plan to relocate 
the base, and focuses particularly on charges that former Japanese Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama failed to deliver on a promise to remove the base from Okinawa 
prefecture in 2010. Data come primarily from news coverage and editorials during 
Hatoyama’s election campaign and administration. I will argue that the promise of 
action came not from any particular speech by Mr. Hatoyama, but was an 
interdiscursive achievement involving Hatoyama, members of his cabinet, the main 
opposition party, and the Japanese news media. I discuss the concept of a 
metaphorical promise, an expectation of future action created not through any specific 
speech act but through complexes of social interaction. 
 
 In 1945, during the Second World War, US Army and Marine divisions 
launched an attack on Okinawa and the Ryukyu islands in the south of Japan. The 
plan was to seize the islands in order to build a forward base from which to attack the 
main islands of the Japanese archipelago. Anticipating such an attack, the Japanese 
military had fortified Okinawa and the surrounding area, conscripting some 20,000 
local men and boys in the process (Fisch 1987). In fierce fighting from April to June 
1945, the US forces defeated the Japanese troops defending the islands. A US Marine 
Corpss estimate suggests that more than 107,000 Japanese fighters were killed during 
the battle, while US losses included 38,000 killed, wounded, or missing in action, plus 
an additional 26,000 non-combat casualties (Nichols and Shaw 1955). 
 Following the Battle of Okinawa, the United States Army established an 
administration to govern the islands while building bases from which to continue the 
war (Fisch 1987). In August of 1945, following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces, ending the fighting. Japan was 
occupied by American and British Commonwealth forces from 1945 to 1952, during 
which time control of Okinawa and the surrounding Ryukyu islands was shifted from 
the Army to a US civil administration. In practice, however, policies and programs of 
the military and civilian administrations were largely unchanged (Fisch 1987). The 
Japanese Constitution, accepted in 1947, renounced war and committed the nation not 
to establish military forces.
1
 US forces in Okinawa therefore continued to build bases 
to serve in place of Japanese forces. With the start of the Cold War and the 
establishment of a communist government in China, Okinawa’s proximity to US 
interests in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Guam also made it a valuable staging ground 
for American forces (Fisch 1987). 
 Under the 1952 peace treaty that formally ended the war, administrative 
control of Okinawa was ceded to the United States (Treaty of Peace with Japan 1952). 
The islands were administered by the United States from 1952 until 1972, when they 
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 Japan today has a de facto military called the Self Defence Forces. The United States nonetheless 
commits to defend Japan against military attack under treaty and status of forces agreements 
(Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 1960). 
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were returned to Japanese control. During this time dozens of Marine, Air Force, 
Navy, and Army bases were established in the islands that now comprise Okinawa 
Prefecture, and many remain there even after the islands’ return to Japan. 
 While many Japanese people favor the presence of US troops, which are 
thought to deter aggression from neighboring states, the majority in Okinawa are less 
sanguine. Although Okinawa comprises less than one percent of Japan’s land area, it 
hosts nearly 75% of US military installations in the country (Ministry of Defense 
2006). The large military presence creates noise, land use conflicts, and safety issues, 
including occasional military accidents and frequent traffic incidents. US Marine 
Corps Air Station Futenma, an installation of more than 1,200 acres (500 hectares) in 
the middle of the city of Ginowan, has been a particular focus for Okinawans uneasy 
with the US military presence (Inoue 2007). Futenma came under increased criticism 
in 1995 when a twelve-year-old girl was abducted and raped by US Marines stationed 
there (Economist 2010). In 1996 Tokyo and Washington began negotiations to remove 
Air Station Futenma from Ginowan and to return the land and facilities to Japanese 
control (Inoue 2007). 
 Today, more than a decade after the start of negotiations and five years after 
Tokyo and Washington agreed on a realignment plan, Air Station Futenma remains in 
Ginowan. The 2006 realignment plan called for the Marines at Futenma to be split 
between locations in Guam and elsewhere in Okinawa. Press coverage in 2009 and 
2010 suggested that then-prime minister Yukio Hatoyama had promised to remove the 
Marines from Okinawa entirely, a promise that he failed to deliver. Yet there is no 
single moment, no clear speech in which Hatoyama commits himself and his 
government to such a course of action. Instead, the “promise” evolved over the course 
of several months in the words of many individuals. This chapter explores the genesis 
of that promise and the interpersonal nature of political promising, as well as 
ideologies of political promising as an individual speech act. It suggests that, as peace 
is not merely the absence of war, political accord is not merely the the absence of 
discordant speech. 
 
Political promising 
 
In “Read My Article,” Jane Hill (2001) undertakes an investigation of political 
promising in the United States by investigating a speech by candidate George H.W. 
Bush during the 1988 Republican National Convention. In his speech, Bush predicted, 
“The Congress will push me to raise taxes […] and I’ll say to them, ‘Read my lips: 
No new taxes’” (qtd in Hill 2001). When President Bush accepted a 1990 budget that 
included new taxes as well as an increase in rates, newspapers and other 
commentators accused him of breaking a promise. Members of Bush’s White House 
staff and former campaign staff insisted, on the contrary, that the “Read My Lips” line 
was not intended as a promise of action but as an expression of leadership style. Bush 
would go on to lose his 1992 bid for re-election, a loss partially attributed to loss of 
trust among voters. 
 Hill (2001) notes that American political speech must fulfill at least two 
functions, and thus it is judged against two different metrics. First, a politician must 
give his or her “word,” specific information about planned actions and goals. Hill 
calls this the discourse of truth since the speaker is bound by Grice’s (1975) maxim of 
quality to say only what they believe to be true and not what they believe to be false. 
If this “word” is seen as false, the politician may be held unworthy of election. At the 
same time, though, the politician is judged in terms of leadership and thus must speak 
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with an eye toward what Hill calls the discourse of theater. In addition to his or her 
“word,” the politician must express a “message,” a set of positive emotional themes 
that draw voters to the candidate or leader. “Message” is expressed through theatrical 
cues such as images of the politician and music or colors associated with a campaign, 
and must also be reflected in the candidate’s way of speaking. 
 In the case of George H.W. Bush, the line “Read my lips: No new taxes” was 
intended, according to Bush’s aides, as an expression of message. In poetic terms, it 
has two spondee triplets, sets of three stressed syllables, making it highly rhythmic. Its 
use of reported speech – the candidate’s own speech in an imagined future – makes it 
highly personal. And the words “read my lips” were variously attributed to actor Clint 
Eastwood (Hill 2001) or various rock and roll musicians (Safire 1988), making it 
highly masculine. 
 At the same time, however, the line can be understood not simply as an 
abstract expression of “message” but also as a specific instance of “word.” Since it 
purports to quote a future utterance by Mr. Bush, it commits him to utter these words 
or at least to hold to the notion they seem to express. It can be heard as a commissive 
speech act (Searle 1975, 1980), a promise of future action, and indeed was widely 
interpreted as such. 
 Although John Searle (1980) suggests that commissives ‒ promises of future 
action ‒ are a central speech act in human interaction, research in various settings, 
especially Michelle Rosaldo’s (1982) study of Ilongot speech in the Philippines, 
shows that the particular speech acts that are held to be central vary from one setting 
to the next. Hill (2001) recognizes that judgment in terms of truth and theater are 
aspects of American political speech, and that local linguistic ideologies determine 
how acts of speech are evaluated. It is within a “regime of personalism” in the United 
States that the utterances of a politician can be taken as both expressions of personal 
leadership ability and commitments to future action. 
 The study which forms the data for this chapter initially set out to investigate 
certain promises attributed to Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in order to 
see whether the discourse of truth and the discourse of theater that Hill identifies in 
US political rhetoric are equally at play in Japan.  
 In August 2009 Hatoyama became prime minister when his Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) took control of the Diet, the Japanese parliament, by winning a 
landslide election victory over the long-time ruling party, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP). Shortly after the Hatoyama government was formed in September 2009, 
a public opinion survey found a 72% approval rate among respondents. By the spring 
of 2010, however, that approval rating had fallen to around 20% and newspaper 
editorials, opposition politicians, and even some former coalition partners were 
calling for Hatoyama’s resignation (Japan Times 2010, May 5).  
 Press coverage cited two causes for the sudden fall in the government’s 
popularity: a financial scandal and a broken promise. The financial scandal involved 
allegedly improper contributions to Hatoyama’s campaign and to that of former DPJ 
president Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa would eventually be indicted over his alleged 
improprieties. More curious, though, is the charge of false promises.  
 According to news coverage as well as newspaper editorials, Hatoyama had 
failed to deliver on his campaign promise to remove US Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma from Okinawa. What makes this charge curious is not Hatoyama’s failure to 
remove the base ‒ he handled the issue clumsily, and the base is still where it was 
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before his election. Rather, the curiosity comes from the fact that Hatoyama did not 
mention the base during his campaign. Indeed, an editorial in the International Herald 
Tribune Asahi newspaper before the election lamented the fact that the DPJ made no 
promises about the base (IHT/Asahi 2009, July 27). Yet by the following spring the 
same newspaper was among those charging that Hatoyama “failed... on his promise to 
move the facility ‘at least’ out of the prefecture” (IHT/Asahi 2010, May 15).  
 During the 2009 campaign, the Democratic Party of Japan’s election platform 
made only vague allusions to a possible re-examination of US forces in Japan, and did 
not mention the Futenma station by name. Instead, an expectation that arose both 
during the campaign and after the election was cast in retrospect as a campaign 
promise, despite a general lack of clear statements on the issue during the campaign. 
With this in mind, I analyzed a corpus of newspaper articles and editorials to trace 
how this “promise” came to be jointly constructed by the news media, Hatoyama, 
members of his cabinet, and partners in the coalition government. 
 The discourses analyzed here reveal ideologies within contemporary Japanese 
politics that locate responsibility for truth and leadership in particular individuals. 
This cluster of ideologies is similar to that described by Hill (2001) among 
Americans, and make political speech similarly “dangerous” in Japan and the United 
States. In addition, the analysis illustrates how discourses of promising and leading do 
not issue solely from the individuals held responsible for them. Interlocutors and 
interpreters contribute to the discourses which they then attribute to political leaders. 
 
Metaphorical promising 
 
In everyday language, the noun promise is used in multiple senses, at least two of 
which are relevant to the discussion here. In one sense, a promise is a linguistic act in 
which one person expresses a commitment to undertake some activity in the future. In 
a prototypical promise of this sense a speaker may say, for example, “I promise to pay 
you twenty dollars tomorrow.” By saying these words the speaker commits to pay 
twenty dollars to the listener the following day. In the philosophy of language this 
type of speech, along with its required preconditions and its ensuing commitment, is 
known as a commissive speech act. Searle defines commissive speech acts as, “those 
illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker... to some future course of 
action” (1975: 356). 
 A second sense of the noun promise in everyday language relates not to an act 
of speaking but to an expectation of future performance. For example, an athlete, a 
new employee, or a young scholar may be said to “show great promise.” A promising 
scholar does not actually commit herself to particular actions in the future through 
acts of speaking. Instead, aspects of the scholar’s behavior, such as asking insightful 
questions or writing well, as well as aspects of the scholar’s social positioning, such 
as relationships with prominent teachers or acceptance at prestigious institutions cause 
observers to expect future academic or professional success. Unlike a commissive 
speech act, “showing promise” in this sense does not require sincerity or commitment 
on the part of the promiser. Still, if the expectations of future success are not met ‒ if, 
for example, the young scholar does not go on to produce interesting work in her field 
of study ‒ one may speak of unfulfilled promise. 
 What both of these ideas have in common is an orientation toward future 
actions or states. As the speaker who makes a promise commits to some future action, 
the hearers expect this action to be fulfilled at the appropriate time. When observers 
label an athlete, scholar, or the like as “showing promise” they expect some positive 
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performance in the future (though neither the nature nor the time of the performance 
need be precisely specified). Talk of promise in both senses therefore relates to 
expectations about the future. 
 In the case described below, expectations about the future are built from a 
combination of discourse and social positioning. Between 1998 and 2009 the 
Democratic Party of Japan was a major opposition party in Japan’s parliament, while 
the Liberal Democratic Party held parliamentary majority and the position of prime 
minister. With the election of a DPJ majority in 2009, then, came an expectation that 
certain government policies would change. These expectations included both specific 
programs that the party outlined in its election manifesto and general ideas about 
change and reform that grew simply from the fact that a new party had come to 
power. As president of the Democratic Party of Japan, Yukio Hatoyama both made 
promises ‒ he uttered certain locutions that committed him to specific actions ‒ and 
showed promise; he raised expectations simply by virtue of being the leader of the 
former opposition party. 
 Hill (2001) notes that locating responsibility for a promise in a single speaker 
is part of an American linguistic ideology that she labels the regime of personalism, 
building on observations by Alessandro Duranti (1993). The truth and meaning of a 
discourse may be distributed across the range of individuals involved in the 
discourse’s production and uptake, yet traditionally we hold a single individual 
responsible for the discourse. In the case of a promise, we identify a single promiser 
and hold this individual responsible if expectations, which are jointly constructed and 
held, are not met. 
 In the case that follows, there is no single locutionary act, no utterance in 
which Hatoyama commits himself to remove the US Marines from Okinawa. 
Expectations for action, and the ability to act, are widely distributed among 
participants. Furthermore, these expectations develop not only from linguistic action 
but also from social positioning. The promise at the center of the events, then, 
resembles a commissive speech act in some respects, and is held to have the effect of 
such an illocution, even though it has neither the linguistic form nor the distribution of 
speaker/listener roles of a typical promise. It is instead a metaphorical promise, in the 
sense that it is regarded as a promise despite the crucial absence of an act of speaking. 
 
The data 
 
Data for this study come primarily from four English-medium news sources published 
in Japan. Kyodo News is a cooperative news agency that distributes stories from its 
own reporters and from member newspapers and broadcasters in Japanese, English, 
and Chinese throughout Japan and overseas. Daily Yomiuri is the English-language 
publication of Yomiuri Shimbun, a center-right broadsheet that is the largest daily 
newspaper in Japan. International Herald Tribune Asahi (hereafter IHT/Asahi) is 
published by Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s second-largest newspaper, in collaboration with 
the International Herald Tribune, an affiliate of The New York Times. The Japan 
Times, a centrist broadsheet published exclusively in English, has a smaller circulation 
than the other sources. 
 The newspaper articles and editorials analyzed in this chapter were gathered 
using both the Factiva and Proquest newspaper archives. Stories published between 
June 2009 and June 2010 mentioning the Democratic Party of Japan, Yukio 
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Hatoyama, or the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma were collected. Removing 
duplicates and minor updates yielded a corpus of approximately 450 pieces, each of 
which was read and analyzed using qualitative methods of discourse analysis. This 
corpus of Japanese news stories was supplemented with documents referenced or 
alluded to in editorials or reportage in the corpus. Two manifestos, published by the 
Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party prior to the August 2009 
general election, describe each party’s platform for governance (DPJ 2009; LDP 
2009). In addition, the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment 
Implementation,” the text of a 2006 agreement between Japan and the United States to 
remove Marines from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Guam and other parts of 
Okinawa, was published by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its public web site 
(MOFA 2006). Finally, a guest editorial by Yukio Hatoyama published in the New 
York Times on 26 August 2009 was also included in the corpus (Hatoyama 2009). In 
addition to these corpus materials a third election manifesto, that of the DPJ’s 
coalition partner Social Democratic Party, was subsequently consulted (SDP 2009). 
 
Government in Japan 
 
Japan is a constitutional monarchy. The Emperor of Japan is the nominal head of 
state, but he holds essentially no executive or legislative power. Government is via a 
parliamentary system comprising two houses, collectively known as the Kokkai or 
Diet. The members of each house are elected by Japan’s citizens through a 
combination of direct election of individual members and proportional election via 
political parties. Legislation is introduced and voted in the lower House of 
Representatives. If a bill passes the lower house, it moves on to the upper House of 
Councilors. If the upper house rejects a bill, it may still become law if it receives 
support from a two-thirds super-majority in a second vote in the lower house. 
 The prime minister, elected from the lower House of Representatives by a vote 
of both houses, serves as the executive head of government. The prime minister in 
turn selects a cabinet, whose members may come from either the lower or the upper 
house. Elections for the lower house are held every four years, or following a vote of 
no-confidence by its members. Members of the upper house serve six year terms, with 
elections for approximately half of the members every three years. 
 Parallel to the cabinet is a strong bureaucratic system. The prime minister 
appoints Ministers of State responsible for foreign affairs, justice, defense, education, 
and ten other specific functions. Each ministry also features a Senior Vice Minister, 
the highest ranking civil servant in the ministry’s bureaucracy. Given the short terms 
in office of most cabinet ministers (often one to two years), these senior bureaucrats 
traditionally have both managed the ministries’ professional civil servants and also led 
policy direction, with political cabinet ministers simply accepting or rejecting 
decisions of the Senior Vice Minister (Neary 2004). This arrangement began to 
change under the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001 to 
2006 (Estévez-Abe 2006, Neary 2004), a shift which continued under Prime Minister 
Hatoyama. 
 Compared to Great Britain or other Westminster-style parliaments, the 
Japanese Diet features a relatively weak party system. Individual members of 
parliament tend to owe loyalty not to the party itself but to other individual 
politicians. Parties tend to be divided into habatsu or factions, each loyal to one 
powerful leader (Estevez-Abe 2006). Prior to the government of Prime Minister 
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Koizumi, cabinet members were often chosen in a manner to maximize the number of 
factions represented in the cabinet (Neary 2004). 
 Before becoming party leader Yukio Hatoyama was associated with a faction 
in the DPJ loyal to Ichiro Ozawa, who led the party immediately prior to Hatoyama. 
This association would seem to have an important effect on Hatoyama's own 
government for two reasons. First, Ozawa's alleged fund raising improprieties, which 
led to his resignation as party leader, were cited as one reason for Hatoyama's falling 
poll numbers in early 2010 (Kin 2009). Moreover, unlike Hatoyama, Ozawa actually 
had expressed a desire to reduce the presence of US forces in Japan early in 2009, 
several months before Hatoyama became party leader (Furukawa, Murao, and Kuromi 
2009). Although one might expect that this fact influenced expectations for 
Hatoyama's own position on base realignment, news sources in the corpus do not 
mention Ozawa in regard to the Futenma controversy after August 2009. For that 
reason, fuller exploration of Ozawa's role in the issue is beyond the scope of this 
analysis. 
 Japan’s lower house of parliament as well as the cabinet was controlled by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) or by coalitions including the LDP almost 
continuously from 1955 until 2009, with the exception of a coalition government of 
smaller parties that ruled for eleven months during 1993-94. Since 2006, though, 
popular discontent with the long-time ruling party had been growing in Japan, and 
three governments in a row had lasted no more than one year each (see Table 1). The 
DPJ swept to power promising to end corruption in the national government, increase 
direct benefits to individuals, and devolve more power to local governments (DPJ 
2009). 
 
Table 1.  Japan’s recent prime ministers 
Prime Minister  Political party Dates in office 
Junichiro Koizumi Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) April 2001-Sept. 2006 
Shinzō Abe LDP Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007 
Yasuo Fukuda LDP Sept. 2007-Sept. 2008 
Taro Aso LDP Sept. 2008-Sept. 2009 
Yukio Hatoyama Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Sept. 2009-June 2010 
Naoto Kan DPJ June 2010-Sept. 2011 
Yoshihiko Noda DPJ Sept. 20011-Dec. 2012 
 
 The government of LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001 to 2006 
was generally regarded as successful, and Koizumi himself was quite popular. 
Koizumi was one of the first leaders to take advantage of changes in Japanese election 
laws and party rules that allowed for greater concentration of power in the office of 
prime minister (Estévez-Abe 2006). He was a highly visible party leader who led his 
party to a substantial electoral victory in 2005 and used his strong majority to push 
through fiscally conservative policies, including privatization of the postal service. 
Following Koizumi’s retirement as prime minister and party leader, however, the next 
three LDP prime ministers held the office for only one year each. Shinzō Abe resigned 
in 2007 amid opposition criticism involving funding scandals; Yasuo Fukuda was 
censured by the opposition-controlled upper house in 2008 and resigned thereafter; 
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and Taro Aso left the party’s leadership in 2009 when the DPJ soundly defeated the 
LDP in the general election. 
 In the Democratic Party of Japan’s manifesto, its platform for the 2009 
elections, party president Yukio Hatoyama promised that if elected his government 
would rule by five principles. The first three principles ‒ politician-led government, 
cabinet-centered policy making, and leadership from the Prime Minister’s Office ‒ 
were reminiscent of Koizumi’s ruling style. Principle 4, “From a vertically organized 
society of vested interests to a horizontal society bound by human ties,” appeared to 
be an expression of greater social progressivism, and the details of the manifesto 
called for increased social spending on childcare allowances, free public high schools, 
and reform of the pension and medical care systems. Under the heading of Principle 5, 
“From centralized government to regional sovereignty,” the manifesto promised to 
give greater decision-making authority to local governments. 
 
Emergence of the promise 
 
In 2005 and 2006, negotiators from the United States and Japan developed a plan to 
“realign” US military installations in Okinawa Prefecture in order to remove US 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma while reconstituting many of the base’s functions 
elsewhere in Okinawa and in Guam. On 1 May 2006 US Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga signed 
the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (MOFA 2006). 
The Aso-Rice agreement called for the two countries to build a new air station off the 
coast of Henoko, Okinawa, near the existing US Camp Schwab base by 2014. 
Approximately 8,000 US Marines and 9,000 dependents would then be removed from 
Japan to Guam, other Marines moved to the new air station, and Futenma and other 
facilities returned to Japanese control. 
 The Aso-Rice agreement was controversial within Okinawa. Although it 
would remove the Futenma base from the city of Ginowan, the off-shore replacement 
facility would still be within Okinawa prefecture, and its construction would destroy a 
coral reef and threaten the habitat of a protected marine mammal (Economist 2010). 
The plan was nonetheless acceptable in Tokyo and in Washington, and subsequent 
governments ‒ including three short-lived LDP governments in Japan ‒ made no 
moves to change it. 
 The Democratic Party of Japan made little mention of the controversial Aso-
Rice agreement during the summer of 2009, amid preparations for an expected 
general election. One of the few mentions of US forces in Okinawa in the Diet that 
summer was a statement by Taro Aso. The former minister of foreign affairs was by 
this time serving as prime minister. During a debate in June with DPJ president 
Hatoyama, Aso criticized a past suggestion from the former DPJ president, Ichiro 
Ozawa, that most US forces should be removed from Japan. Coverage of the debate in 
Daily Yomiuri suggested that Aso “dredged up a past remark” by Hatoyama’s 
predecessor because he was losing the debate (Furukawa, Murao and Kuromi 2009). 
For the press and much of the public, the status of US forces was not a central concern 
that summer. 
 Okinawa and the status of US military forces was not a major issue for the 
DPJ, either. It became an issue only when the DPJ began discussion with another 
opposition party, the Social Democratic Party, about the possibility of forming a 
coalition government if elected. The SDP is to the political left of the DPJ, and is 
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avowedly pacifist. Under the heading “Peace and human rights” the SDP election 
manifesto made the following commitment. 
 
米国に在日米軍再編についての再協議を求め、沖縄などの米軍基地の縮
小・撤去をすすめます。普天間基地の閉鎖・返還を求め、辺野古への新
基地建設など、基地機能の強化に反対します。「グアム移転協定」の廃
棄を要求します。 
 
Request new consultations with the United States on the realignment of 
US forces in Japan, and hasten the reduction/removal of US bases from 
Okinawa and elsewhere. Seek to hasten the closure/return [to Japan] of 
the Futenma base, and oppose the construction of a new base at 
Henoko or the expansion of [existing] bases. Demand repeal of the 
“Guam transfer agreement.” (SDP 2009, my translation) 
 
Unlike the DPJ, which avoided strong statements on the issue, the SDP committed 
itself not only to support the removal of Air Station Futenma but also to oppose its 
replacement with the new facilities called for in what it labels the “Guam transfer 
agreement,” the 2006 Aso-Rice agreement. 
 SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima initially resisted working with the DPJ since it 
refused to take positions on the US military in Japan or Japan’s support of US and 
British naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Eventually, however, SDP joined DPJ 
and a third minor party, the centrist People’s New Party, in embracing five pledges to 
be made in each party’s manifesto in anticipation of forming a coalition government 
(Daily Yomiuri 2009, June 13). The five pledges related to domestic economic issues, 
and not to military or foreign affairs. 
 Throughout July of 2009 Hatoyama spoke out on domestic issues. His major 
goal if elected would be to reform the relationship between the cabinet and 
government bureaucracies. Under the Koizumi administration the office of prime 
minister had begun to take the lead in setting government policy, minimizing the role 
of civil service senior vice ministers (Estévez-Abe 2006). Hatoyama vowed to take 
power away from the bureaucracies and to give it not solely to the prime minister but 
to each of the cabinet’s Ministers of State (Harris and Murphy 2009). 
 In addition to restructuring the relationship between the cabinet and the 
bureaucracy, Hatoyama and the DPJ campaigned on economic issues. At a “next 
cabinet” meeting in July, they pledged to make high schools tuition free, establish a 
child care allowance, establish supports for agriculture, and cut several provisional 
taxes (Daily Yomiuri 2009, July 17). Hatoyama avoided making any promises to 
change Japan’s diplomatic or military positions. In response to a formal request from 
the SDP to help craft legislation banning nuclear weapons, he expressed concern over 
possible threats from North Korea and said that he would need to consult with the 
USA before taking any action (Kyodo 2009, July 24). 
 The Democratic Party of Japan officially released its manifesto for the 
upcoming election on 18 July 2009, though versions had been leaked to the press 
some weeks earlier. The manifesto made no explicit mention of Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma. Near the end of the document, however, was a brief mention of the 
realignment agreement. Point 51 of the manifesto’s 55 pledges is headed “Build a 
close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship.” As with the rest of the document, this pledge 
is largely economic, suggesting that the two countries should conclude a free trade 
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agreement while being careful not to harm Japan’s agricultural industry. The section’s 
last paragraph discusses US forces and base realignment. 
 
日米地位協定の改定を提起し、米軍再編や在日米軍基地のあり方について
も見直しの方向で臨む。 
 
Propose the revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement; 
move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of the U.S. 
military forces in Japan and the role of U.S. military bases in Japan. 
(DPJ 2009, official DPJ translation) 
 
This is hardly a clear commitment. It suggests only the possibility of revisiting the 
Status of Forces Agreement, not a commitment to change that agreement or the Aso-
Rice plan in specific ways. In what appears to be a criticism of the DPJ’s lack of 
clarity on this issue, the Liberal Democratic Party’s manifesto suggested, “We cannot 
entrust the safety of Japan to a political party... that cannot even reach agreement 
among its members about their stance on these [military and diplomatic] issues” (LDP 
2009).
2
 
 On 26 August 2009, a guest editorial by Yukio Hatoyama was published in The 
New York Times. In it, he criticized globalization as a form of neo-liberal capitalism 
centered on US interests, and called for “fraternity ‒ as in the French slogan ‘liberté, 
égalité, fraternité’ ‒ as a force for moderating the danger” (Hatoyama 2009). An 
editorial in The Japan Times read Hatoyama’s criticism of the United States as a 
signal that he would try to move the Futenma replacement site outside of Japan (Japan 
Times 2009, September 6). But Hatoyama’s editorial contained no mention of the 
realignment plan. His comments on military issues were limited to an offhand 
criticism of the war in Iraq and an allowance that the US “will remain the world’s 
leading military and economic power for the next two to three decades” (Hatoyama 
2009). The bulk of his criticism related to economic and political philosophy. 
 The Democratic Party of Japan won the election on 30 August and took 
enough seats to form a government. The DPJ introduced a coalition government on 9 
September with leaders of the People’s New Party and the Social Democratic Party in 
minor cabinet positions. An 11 September report in The Japan Times suggested that 
the Futenma realignment had been a sticking point in negotiating the coalition. The 
SDP reportedly demanded that the new government renegotiate the agreement with 
the US, while the DPJ resisted, not wanting to show any disagreement with the US 
ahead of a scheduled visit to Japan from President Barack Obama. In the end the 
parties agreed to “propose revising the SOFA and take a stance toward reviewing the 
realignment plans” (Japan Times 2009, September 11). 
 Prime Minister Hatoyama and US President Obama met for the first time on 
23 September. They agreed to work together to face North Korea and to combat 
global warming, but did not discuss any contentious issues (Japan Times 2009, 
September 25). An editorial in the conservative Daily Yomiuri urged the DPJ to stick 
to the 2006 Aso-Rice agreement, saying that this would be the fastest route to 
removing US Marines from Ginowan (Daily Yomiuri 2009, September 24). 
                                                 
2
 The LDP manifesto was released on 12 August 2009, six days before the DPJ manifesto. It 
therefore cannot be reacting specifically to language in the final document. Nonetheless, the 
criticism clearly appears to be directed at the DPJ position. The LDP manifesto does not mention 
US forces or base realignment. 
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 Over the next two weeks conflicting ideas about how to deal with Air Station 
Futenma were announced from various cabinet offices. The State Minister for 
Okinawa, Seiji Maehara, suggested that the government may revisit the Aso-Rice 
agreement (Kyodo 2009, October 3a), but Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said 
that it would be difficult to find any other solution (Kyodo 2009, October 2). At a 
press conference in Cambodia, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada said that he planned 
to renegotiate the base realignment deal with the US in exchange for a promise that 
Japan would continue refueling ships in support of the war in Afghanistan (Kyodo 
2009, October 3b).  
 On 7 October Prime Minister Hatoyama held a press conference to address the 
conflicting statements from cabinet ministers. He reportedly met with the mayor of 
Ginowan and the governor of Okinawa, each of whom seemed prepared to accept 
realignment as described in the Aso-Rice agreement. At his press conference 
Hatoyama referred to the manifesto’s pledge to “move in the direction of re-
examining realignment.” He suggested that the manifesto may be regarded as a 
promise, but at the same time intimated that the re-examination process may not be a 
timely one. 
 
国民との約束事だから基本的にそれを守ることが大事だ。簡単に変える
べきではない。[しかし]時間という要素によって変化する可能性は否定
しない。(qtd in Okinawa Times 2009) 
 
What we stated in our manifesto is certainly one promise we have 
made, and I still don’t think we should change that so easily. [But] I 
would not deny the possibility that it could change in terms of time. 
(qtd in Kyodo 2009, October 7) 
 
In framing the manifesto’s decidedly weak language as 約束事 yakusokugoto ‒ a 
promise or arrangement ‒ Hatoyama appears to strengthen the illocutionary force of 
the manifesto somewhat. At the same time, however, he weakens the suggestion that 
change will happen in the near future. Furthermore, there is no clarification of what 
that change might be or when it may arrive. Hatoyama offers no clear vision for 
government action at any definite time in the future. 
 The following day Daily Yomiuri published an editorial by Riichiro Maeki, 
deputy political news editor of Yomiuri Shimbun.
3
 Maeki called on the DPJ “to 
review their electoral promises” (Maeki 2009). After criticizing the government’s 
handling of a separate health care system for the elderly and its abandoning of LDP 
plans to build a dam, he writes, “In its general election manifesto, the DPJ stated that 
the realignment plans of U.S. forces in Japan ‘must be reviewed,’” a review that 
Maeki suggests would be a mistake (Maeki 2009). Despite the quotation marks in 
Maeki’s prose, however, the words “must be reviewed” do not appear in the DPJ 
manifesto. The party's own official English translation only called for a “move in the 
direction of re-examining.” Likewise the original Japanese text contained nothing 
suggesting strong obligation.  
 
                                                 
3
 Maeki’s editorial, written in Japanese and translated into English, was undoubtedly prepared before 
Hatoyama delivered his remarks in Okinawa. 
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米軍再編や在日米軍基地のあり方についても見直しの方向で臨む。 
 
Concerning the realignment of US military forces or how US military 
bases in Japan ought to be, look toward reviewing the course of action. 
(DPJ 2009, my translation) 
 
Maeki calls on the DPJ to be flexible in dealing with these issues. Given the diversity 
of suggestions emanating from the cabinet, however, obstinacy on the issue of base 
realignment does not seem to be the problem. 
 From 26 October to 30 November, the parliament convened in extraordinary 
session. In light of the United States congress’s recent voted to accept the 2006 Aso-
Rice agreement on Futenma relocation and President Obama’s planned visit to Japan 
in November, editorials in all three newspapers in the corpus called for the 
government to conclude its review of the relocation plan quickly (Daily Yomiuri 
2009, October 14; Japan Times 2009, October 23; IHT/Asahi 2009, October 27). The 
conservative Daily Yomiuri was especially insistent on this point, publishing editorials 
on November 3, 7, 14, and 18 calling on Hatoyama to accept the 2006 agreement. 
When the parliamentary session ended with no conclusion on the issue, the paper 
accused Hatoyama of sacrificing Japan’s relationship with the United States in order 
to keep the Social Democrats in the government (Daily Yomiuri 2009, December 4). 
An editorial in IHT/Asahi was less alarmist, suggesting that the US-Japan relationship 
could weather disagreement on this issue, but warning that if Hatoyama could not 
make a decision in spite of his coalition partners’ intransigence, there would be no 
political progress before the next general election (IHT/Asahi 2009, December 5). 
 In December Hatoyama announced that he would not make any decision on 
the Futenma relocation issue before the end of the year. US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton visited Japan’s ambassador in Washington to urge implementation of the Aso-
Rice agreement (Japan Times 2009, December 24). Public approval for the Hatoyama 
government fell from around 70% after the election to less than 50% in December, 
with many respondents expressing displeasure with the prime minister’s lack of 
leadership (IHT/Asahi 2009, December 23). 
 In January Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada attended a summit meeting in 
Hawaii with Secretary Clinton in an attempt to shore up relations between the two 
nations (IHT/Asahi 2010, January 11; Daily Yomiuri 2010, January 14). In a speech 
before parliament Prime Minister Hatoyama announced, “The government shall 
decide on a specific [Futenma] replacement site by the end of May” (Kyodo 2010, 
January 30). Local elections in Okinawa by that time had made acceptance of the 
Aso-Rice agreement more difficult, however. For the first time a mayor had been 
elected in Nago, the city near the proposed replacement site, who opposed building 
the new facility. A resolution had also passed in the Okinawa assembly opposing the 
2006 agreement. With growing opposition to the current plan and no specific 
alternative on the table, editorials in each of the newspapers in the corpus criticized 
Hatoyama’s lack of leadership (IHT/Asahi 2010, January 26; Japan Times 2010, 
January 27; Daily Yomiuri 2010, January 30). 
 Unlike earlier statements in the party manifesto and Hatoyama’s addresses to 
parliament during the extraordinary session, his declaration that “the government shall 
decide on a specific replacement site by the end of May” was a clear and specific 
commitment to a future course of action. By April newspaper editorials were referring 
to Hatoyama’s “promises” (IHT/Asahi 2010, March 6; Daily Yomiuri 2010, April 15; 
Japan Times 2010, April 24). 
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 Public opinion surveys in May found that approval for the DPJ-led 
government had fallen to around 20%. Of those dissatisfied, 40% cited a lack of 
leadership and 19% a lack of trust (Japan Times 2010, May 5). In newspaper 
editorials the lack of trust came in for particular criticism. On 6 May Hatoyama 
insisted to reporters that his party’s manifesto never promised to remove the Futenma 
replacement facility outside of Okinawa. In making this argument he explained, 
“Moving it at the very least outside the prefecture merely represented my own 
thinking” (Asahi.com 2010). Editorials, however, seized upon the words “at least 
outside the prefecture,” and cast this not as an excuse offered in May but as a promise 
made the previous August. IHT/Asahi wrote, “Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
pledged during an election campaign to relocate the U.S. Marine Corpss Air Station 
Futenma outside Okinawa Prefecture” (2010, May 7). The Japan Times wrote, 
“Before the Aug. 30 Lower House election last year, Mr. Yukio Hatoyama... made a 
campaign pledge to move U.S. Marine Corpss Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, outside 
Okinawa or even abroad” (2010, May 7). While he made vague allusions to the base 
realignment plan during the campaign, however, Hatoyama had refrained from 
explicitly making any such promise. 
 On 13 May the DPJ released its revised base realignment plan. Contrary to 
expectations, it was substantially similar to the 2006 Aso-Rice plan, with several 
minor modifications. The replacement facility would still be built at Henoko in 
Okinawa, but instead of a V-shaped pair of runways on reclaimed land, it would 
feature a single runway on pilings. Hatoyama seemed to feel that he had delivered on 
his promise to announce a new plan by the end of May. The Daily Yomiuri, though, 
called the new plan a “hopeless hodge-podge” (2010, May 14), while IHT/Asahi 
declared Hatoyama “has effectively reneged on his promise” (2010, May 15). 
 
Table 2.  Timeline of key events 
Date  Event 
1879 Japan annexes Okinawa prefecture. 
April-June 1945 Battle of Okinawa; US military seizes Okinawa. 
May 1947 Japan adopts a constitution renouncing the right to wage war. 
April 1952 Japan signs the Treaty of Peace officially ending World War II. 
1952-1972 US Civil Administration controls Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. 
January 1960 US/Japan sign “Treaty of mutual cooperation and security.” 
May 1972 Okinawa prefecture returns to Japanese control. US bases remain. 
September 1995 Two Marines and a Navy seaman rape a 12-year-old girl in Ginowan. 
April 1996 Japanese PM and US Ambassador discuss removal of Futenma. 
October 2005 Foreign Minister Aso and Secretary of State Rice agree to move some 
Marines to Guam and to build a new base in Henoko, Okinawa. 
February 2009 DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa suggests a smaller US military presence. 
August 2009 SDP manifesto promises to oppose the Henoko replacement base. 
August 2009 DPJ suggests “move in the direction of re-examining” base relocation. 
December 2009 Hatoyama refuses to decide a base relocation strategy. 
January 2010 Hatoyama promises to name a relocation site by May. 
May 2010 Hatoyama announces a lightly revised relocation plan. 
June 2010 Hatoyama resigns as prime minister. 
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 Most unhappy about the government’s lightly revised plan was the Social 
Democratic Party, which actually had campaigned on a promise to oppose relocation 
within Okinawa. SDP president and the cabinet’s Consumer Affairs Minister Mizuho 
Fukushima threatened to resign from the cabinet over the issue. In order to prevent 
dissension and possible calls to dissolve the government, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Hirofumi Hirano suggested that the cabinet could approve a plan with no specifics, 
and the prime minister would officially announce the details in a speech to the public, 
not to parliament (JIJI 2010, May 28a). Such legal manoeuvring did not satisfy 
Fukushima, however, and when she refused to sign cabinet approval for the 
agreement Hatoyama dismissed her from the cabinet (JIJI 2010, May 28b). On 2 June, 
with the SDP joining the Liberal Democratic Party and minor opposition parties in 
calling for a new government, Hatoyama suddenly and somewhat unexpectedly 
announced his intention to resign (JIJI 2010, June 2). DPJ Minister of Finance Naoto 
Kan was elected new Prime Minister on 4 June (Kyodo 2010, June 9). 
 
Discussion 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan is, in ideological terms, a broad coalition. The party 
was formed in 1996 as a centrist party and was soon joined by the Japan Socialist 
Party, who wished to form a stronger rival to the right and center-right Liberal 
Democratic Party (Christensen 1998). In 1998 the party combined with several 
smaller centrist or center-left parties, and their own version of history records this as 
the official beginning of the party (DPJ 2010). Then in 2003 the party was joined by 
the Liberal Party, a right-leaning party led by former LDP lawmaker Ichiro Ozawa. 
These parties and factions were united less by political vision or ideology than by a 
desire to wrest power from the LDP. 
 Given the broad span of left, right, and center politicians in his party, candidate 
Hatoyama made few bold and unambiguous promises in this party manifesto or his 
campaign speeches. After forming a coalition government with the centrist People’s 
New Party and the pacifist left Social Democratic Party, Prime Minister Hatoyama 
was even more circumspect, often promising to study issues and to come to the best 
possible conclusion, without giving any clear indication of what he thought those 
solutions consisted of, and without even framing the problems clearly. 
 Hatoyama’s lack of strong statements or apparent preferences proved 
problematic in terms of interdiscursive stance-taking. John W. Du Bois defines stance 
as follows. 
 
Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through 
overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, 
positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, 
with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field. (Du 
Bois 2007: 163) 
 
Michael Lempert (2009) analyzes American politicians’ stance-taking across broad 
discursive fields, beyond any particular communicative event. Lempert is particularly 
interested in the notions of “conviction” versus “flip-flopping” in US politics, and 
how judgments about these attributes relate to stance-taking in multiple speech events 
over time. A politician who evaluates an object differently in front of different 
audiences may be charged as an untrustworthy and unreliable flip-flopper.  
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 Hatoyama’s personal stance toward military realignment was never clearly or 
directly stated. His evaluations of various suggestions by members of his coalition 
and other political actors were not transparently present in Hatoyama’s own words, 
but were construed in analysis and interpretation of his words and actions by the news 
media and the people. This situation parallels what Lempert calls “addressivity by 
construal” (2009: 228), in which the stance-taker’s alignment with particular 
addressees is achieved through interpretation by others. Observers projected onto 
Hatoyama’s discourses and stances an evaluation of the advisability of various 
approaches to Futenma’s relocation, an evaluation by construal.  
 While his lack of clear statements may not have opened Hatoyama to charges 
of flip-flopping (a charge commonly made in the US) per se, his uncertain stance 
nonetheless failed to signal conviction (Lempert 2009) or message (Hill 2001). On the 
issue of the Futenma replacement facility, Hatoyama would later suggest that his 
personal preference had been to remove the new base to Guam, and that he later 
concluded that placement in Kagoshima prefecture, Japan, would be a proper 
compromise (Kyodo 2009, June 11). While in the Prime Minister’s Office, though, he 
did not clearly state these preferences. In the absence of such statements the press, the 
public, and members of his government were free to project their own views on the 
“revision” and “re-examining” process called for in the party’s manifesto. 
 Prime Minister Hatoyama’s principle failure seems to relate to, in Hill’s (2001) 
terms, the discourse of theater. He failed to project a consistent message, an image of 
the intellectual conviction and emotional appeal understood as leadership ability. 
Indeed, as his government’s approval ratings fell throughout late 2009 and early 2010, 
respondents to several public opinion surveys cited Hatoyama’s lack of leadership as a 
reason for their disapproval (Daily Yomiuri 2009, October 29; IHT/Asahi 2009, 
December 23; Daily Yomiuri 2010, April 7; IHT/Asahi 2010, April 20). It is curious, 
then, that so many media analyses of the government’s failure blamed Hatoyama for 
failing to keep a promise (e.g. Japan Times 2010, May 7; IHT/Asahi 2010, May 7; 
Daily Yomiuri 2010, May 16; IHT/Asahi 2010, May 25; The Korea Herald 2010, May 
25; JIJI 2010, June 2).  
 In an editorial published just after he announced his resignation, the Daily 
Yomiuri concluded that Hatoyama had actually delivered on many of his campaign 
promises. He introduced subsidies for child care and for agriculture, and made public 
high schools tuition-free. He also made progress toward creating a promised East Asia 
diplomatic community and introduced a law to give the cabinet greater power over the 
bureaucracies (Daily Yomiuri 2010, June 3). The Japan Times suggested that despite 
his successes, two failures came to define Hatoyama: “his failure to keep his promise 
to relocate the functions of [Futenma] out of Okinawa Prefecture, and a political funds 
scandal” (2010, June 3). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The failure of the Hatoyama government illustrates that in Japan, as in the 
United States, individual leaders are deemed responsible for certain discourses that 
surround them. Leaders are judged against two yardsticks: their degree of leadership, 
including conviction and message communicated in a discourse of theater; and their 
degree of honesty, expressed in the discourse of truth and measured by the degree of 
fit between words and actions. 
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 What this case further illustrates is that, at least in Japan, the individual leader 
held responsible for these discourses need not have a central role in their creation. 
During the general election campaign of 2009, Yukio Hatoyama made no clear 
statements regarding removal of US forces from Okinawa prefecture. Yet given his 
party’s pledge to “Move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of the U.S. 
military forces in Japan” (DPJ 2009), his coalition partners’ stated desire to reduce the 
burden on the people of Okinawa (Daily Yomiuri 2009, December 4), and a general 
expectation that a change of government would result in broad policy shifts 
(IHT/Asahi 2009, October 23; JIJI 2010, June 2), many assumed that he would do so. 
In the absence of clear statements Hatoyama, as leader of the government, was held 
accountable for “promises” that did not come primarily from him. 
 As regimes of personalism (Duranti 1988, 1993) lead participants to think of 
discourse as a property that flows from an individual, concomitant ideas lead them to 
think of leadership and political direction in similarly personalist ways. Yet as this 
case shows, neither the individual politician nor the state is the sole locus of political 
discourse. Particularly with democratic systems of governance, but also in other forms 
of society, political will is emergent from the interaction of multiple, diverse 
individuals. This includes not only the “speaker” of traditional philosophy of 
language, but also “hearers” in the broader polity. 
 The lenses of truth and theater described by Hill (2001) apply not only to 
uptake of actual statements during a campaign, but equally to actions and to the lack 
of clear statements from campaigns and governments. Actions taken while in office 
that raise expectations of future change may be taken as promises to act. When a 
metaphorical promise, an expectation of future action that arises among observers but 
is not related to any particular communicative act, is not met, the individual 
implicated in the discourse may still be judged as untrustworthy. 
 The leadership and honesty of a political actor are judged not only against 
their own locutions, but also in light of actions taken or statements made by political 
allies or opponents. In the case described above, Yukio Hatoyama made few direct 
statements about the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma realignment plan. But in 
an atmosphere of great public interest on the issue, Prime Minister Hatoyama was 
held accountable for statements made by his foreign minister, defense minister, and 
chief cabinet secretary, as well as campaign positions by his coalition partner the 
Social Democratic Party. Because his party defeated the Liberal Democratic Party in 
the general election, Hatoyama was also partly defined as “opposite” to LDP 
campaign positions. Finally, expectations expressed in the press and held among the 
electorate were recast as promises by the prime minister and his party. In this 
environment, Hatoyama was held responsible for a metaphorical promise, 
expectations of future action arising from a broadly co-constructed discourse. 
Ultimately Hatoyama was blamed for breaking promises he had only a small role in 
creating. 
 As peace is not merely the absence of war, successful political discourse is not 
merely the absence of divisive or unpopular speech. Political accord arises ‒ or fails 
to arise ‒ among a broad populace. A would-be political leader needs to find 
significant accord with the society he or she would lead. As the case of Yukio 
Hatoyama shows, failure to seek such accord can be a path to loss of position just as 
surely as failure to deliver one’s promises can. Avoiding discord is not a sufficient 
path to peaceful political engagement. Instead, accord and mutual agreement must be 
sought through active engagement with individuals and factions throughout society. 
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